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HOLDING: [1]-The court of chancery abused its discretion in arriving at the corporation's thirty-
day average unaffected market price as the fair value of appellants' shares, because the court of 
chancery's decision to use the corporation's stock price instead of the deal price minus synergies 
was rooted in an erroneous factual finding that lacked record support; the court of chancery 
abused its discretion in using the corporation's unaffected market price since it did so on the 
inapt theory that it needed to make an additional deduction from the deal price for unspecified 












Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN1   Fair Market Value 
The court of chancery's task in an appraisal case is to value what has been taken from the 
shareholder: his proportionate interest in a going concern. That is, the court of chancery must 
value the company as an operating entity, but without regard to post-merger events or other 
possible business combinations. The court of chancery determines fair value exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h), which the Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted as ruling out 
consideration of not just the gains that the particular merger will produce, but also the gains that 
might be obtained from any other merger. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN2   Fair Market Value 
Fair value is more properly described as the value of the company to the stockholder as a going 
concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition. The court of chancery must 
exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that the selling company's 
shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a 
stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can 
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be extracted. For this reason, in cases where the court of chancery has used the price at which a 
company is sold in a third-party transaction, it has excised a reasonable estimate of whatever 
share of synergy or other value the buyer expects from changes it plans to make to the company's 
going concern business plan that has been included in the purchase price as an inducement to the 
sale. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN3   Fair Market Value 
When there is an open opportunity for many buyers to buy and only a few bid (or even just one 
bids), that does not necessarily mean that there is a failure of competition; it may just mean that 
the target's value is not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war above the 
winning price. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN4   Fair Market Value 
A buyer in possession of material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong position 
(and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller when agreeing to buy the company at a 
particular deal price, and that view of value should be given considerable weight by the chancery 
court absent deficiencies in the deal process. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
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Judges: Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, 





In this statutory appraisal case, the Court of Chancery found that the fair value of Aruba 
Networks, Inc., as defined by 8 Del. C. § 262, was $17.13 per share, which was the thirty-day 
average market price at which its shares traded before the media reported news of the transaction 
that gave rise to the appellants' appraisal rights.1  In its post-trial opinion, the Court of Chancery 
engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of its view on the evolution of our State's appraisal law 
and how certain recent decisions have affected the relevance of market-based evidence to 
determining fair value.2  For purposes of this appeal, we need not respond in full to the dicta 
and instead focus on the key issue before us: whether the Court of Chancery abused its 
discretion, based on this record, in arriving at Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price 
as the fair value of the appellants' shares. Because the Court of Chancery's decision to use 
Aruba's stock price instead of the deal price minus synergies was rooted in an erroneous factual 
finding that lacked record support, we answer that in the [*3]  positive and reverse the Court of 
Chancery's judgment. On remand, the Court of Chancery shall enter a final judgment for the 
petitioners awarding them $19.10 per share, which reflects the deal price minus the portion of 




In August 2014, Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP"), a publicly traded company, approached 
Aruba, another publicly traded company, about a potential combination. Aruba hired 
professionals and, in addition to negotiating with HP, began to shop the deal. Five other logical 
strategic bidders were approached, but none of them showed any interest.3  The petitioners did 
not argue below that private equity bidders could compete given the synergies a combination 
with HP or another strategic buyer could garner.4  
After several months of negotiations between the two companies, the Aruba board decided to 
accept HP's offer of $24.67 per share. News of the deal leaked to the press about two weeks later, 
causing Aruba's stock price to jump from $18.37 to $22.24. The next day, after the market 
closed, Aruba released its quarterly results, which beat analyst expectations. Aruba's stock 
price [*4]  rose by 9.7% the following day on the strength of its earnings to close at $24.81 per 
share, just above the deal price.5  
Not long after the deal leaked, both companies' boards approved the transaction, and Aruba and 
HP formally announced the merger at a price of $24.67 per share. The final merger agreement 
allowed for another passive market check.6  However, no superior bid emerged, and the deal 




On August 28, 2015, the appellants and petitioners below, Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. 
and Verition Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd. (collectively, "Verition"), filed this appraisal 
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proceeding in the Court of Chancery, asking the court to appraise the "fair value" of their shares 
under § 262.8  The respondent was Aruba, albeit an Aruba now 100% controlled by HP. In its 
pretrial and initial post-trial briefing, Verition maintained that Aruba's fair value was $32.57 per 
share,9  and Aruba contended that its fair value was either $19.45 per share (before trial) or 
$19.75 per share (after trial).10  In its post-trial answering brief, Aruba contended that its "deal 
price less synergies" value was $19.10 per share.11  Neither party claimed that Aruba's 
preannouncement stock price was [*5]  the best measure of fair value at the time of the merger. 
Post-trial argument was scheduled for May 17, 2017, but the Court of Chancery postponed the 
hearing "once it became clear that the Delaware Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in DFC 
[Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.12  ] likely would have a significant effect on 
the legal landscape."13  After this Court issued its opinion in DFC, the Court of Chancery 
allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the opinion's implications, and the parties 
submitted simultaneous briefs on September 15, 2017. Both parties continued to argue for their 
preferred fair value calculation, and neither party advocated for the adoption of the stock price, 
though Aruba did contend that the stock price was now "informative" of fair value and lent 
support to its argument that fair value as of the time of the merger was in the $19 to $20 per 
share range.14  And the parties hewed to these positions during post-trial oral argument. 
On December 14, 2017, this Court issued its opinion in Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event 
Driven Master Fund Ltd,15  reversing the Court of Chancery's appraisal decision in that case. 
Six days later, [*6]  the Vice Chancellor in this case—who was also the trial judge in Dell—sent 
the parties a letter on his own motion. In the letter, the Vice Chancellor requested supplemental 
briefing on "the market attributes of Aruba's stock" in part because he "learned how many errors 
[he] made in the Dell matter."16  
The parties submitted simultaneous briefs in response to the Vice Chancellor's sua sponte request 
on January 26, 2018. In its brief, Aruba abandoned deal price minus synergies as its main 
benchmark and argued for the first time that its preannouncement stock price was "the single 
most important mark of its fair value."17  Accordingly, Aruba asked the Court of Chancery to 
award the thirty-day unaffected market price of $17.13 per share.18  Aruba's brief focused 
mainly on how the market for its stock was efficient. 
On February 15, 2018, the Court of Chancery issued its post-trial opinion finding that the fair 
value under § 262 was $17.13 per share.19  In its opinion, the Court of Chancery considered 
three different valuation measures: first, the "unaffected market price" of Aruba's stock before 
news of the merger leaked; second, the deal price minus the portion of synergies left with the 
seller; and [*7]  third, the two expert witnesses' valuations, which were based primarily on 
discounted cash flow ("DCF") models.20  
In weighing the valuation methodologies, the Court of Chancery gave no weight to the parties' 
DCF models. The Court of Chancery also determined, based on its own analysis, that the 
appropriate deal price minus synergies value was $18.20. In reaching that conclusion, the Court 
of Chancery started with an estimate of the total amount of synergies HP expected to realize. To 
determine how much of those synergies Aruba's stockholders received in the deal price, the 
Court of Chancery took the midpoint of a study suggesting that "on average, sellers collect 31% 
of the capitalized value of synergies, with the seller's share varying widely from 6% to 51%."21  
This resulted in a deal price minus synergies value of $18.20 per share, $0.90 lower than Aruba's 
own estimate of deal price minus synergies. And although the Vice Chancellor was "inclined to 
think that Aruba's representatives bargained less effectively than they might have," "indicat[ing] 
that [Aruba] obtained fewer synergies than the midpoint range and imply[ing] value north of 
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$18.20 per share,"22  he failed to explain why his [*8]  estimate of $18.20 per share was more 
reliable than Aruba's own estimate of $19.10 per share. 
However, the Vice Chancellor did not adopt his deal price minus synergies value, in part because 
he believed that his "deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an element of 
value resulting from the merger" in the form of "reduced agency costs that result from unitary (or 
controlling) ownership."23  To remedy this, the Vice Chancellor elected to rely exclusively on 
the stock price because he thought he would need to estimate and back out these theoretical 
"reduced agency costs" from the deal price to arrive at a figure that reflected Aruba's value as a 
going concern. According to the Court of Chancery, using the "unaffected market price" of 
Aruba's publicly traded shares "provide[d] a direct estimate" of that endpoint, which led him to 
find the sole indicator of fair value to be that "unaffected market price" of $17.13 per share.24  
Although § 262 requires the Court of Chancery to assess Aruba's fair value as of "the effective 
date of the merger,"25  the Court of Chancery arrived at the unaffected market price by 
averaging the trading price of Aruba's stock during the thirty days before [*9]  news of the 




We reverse the trial court's fair value determination. Under Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett, HN1  
the Court of Chancery's task in an appraisal case is "to value what has been taken from the 
shareholder: 'viz. his proportionate interest in a going concern.'"26  That is, the court must value 
the company "as an operating entity . . . but without regard to post-merger events or other 
possible business combinations."27  Cavalier Oil draws this requirement from § 262's command 
that the court determine fair value "exclusive of any element of value arising from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation,"28  which this Court has 
interpreted as ruling out consideration of not just the gains that the particular merger will 
produce, but also the gains that might be obtained from any other merger.29  As a result, HN2  
fair value "is more properly described as the value of the company to the stockholder as a going 
concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition."30  Under this reading of § 262, 
the Court of Chancery must "exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any value that the 
selling company's shareholders [*10]  would receive because a buyer intends to operate the 
subject company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from 
which synergistic gains can be extracted."31  For this reason, in cases where the Court of 
Chancery has used the price at which a company is sold in a third-party transaction, it has 
excised a reasonable estimate of whatever share of synergy or other value the buyer expects from 
changes it plans to make to the company's "going concern" business plan that has been included 
in the purchase price as an inducement to the sale.32  No party in this proceeding argued to us 
that the long-standing use of going-concern value, or its concomitant requirement to excise 
synergy gains, should be revisited. 
Applying the going-concern standard, we hold that the Court of Chancery abused its discretion in 
using Aruba's "unaffected market price" because it did so on the inapt theory that it needed to 
make an additional deduction from the deal price for unspecified "reduced agency costs." It 
appears to us that the Court of Chancery would have given weight to the deal price minus 
synergies absent its view that it also had to deduct [*11]  unspecified agency costs to adhere to 
Cavalier Oil's going-concern standard.33  As Verition points out, this aspect of the decision is 
not grounded in the record. Judging by the law review articles cited by the Court of Chancery, 
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the theory underlying the court's decision appears to be that the acquisition would reduce agency 
costs essentially because the resulting consolidation of ownership and control would align the 
interests of Aruba's managers and its public stockholders.34  In other words, the theory goes, 
replacing a dispersed group of owners with a concentrated group of owners can be expected to 
add value because the new owners are more capable of making sure management isn't shirking or 
diverting the company's profits, and that added value must be excluded under § 262 as "arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation."35  However, unlike a 
private equity deal, the merger at issue in this case would not replace Aruba's public stockholders 
with a concentrated group of owners; rather, it would swap out one set of public stockholders for 
another: HP's. 
Indeed, neither party [*12]  presented any evidence to suggest that any part of the deal price paid 
by HP, a strategic buyer, involved the potential for agency cost reductions that were not already 
captured by its synergies estimate. Synergies do not just involve the benefits when, for example, 
two symbiotic product lines can be sold together. They also classically involve cost reductions 
that arise because, for example, a strategic buyer believes it can produce the same or greater 
profits with fewer employees36 —in English terms, rendering some of the existing employees 
"redundant." Private equity firms often expect to improve performance and squeeze costs too, 
including by reducing "agency costs."37  Here, the Court of Chancery's belief that it had to 
deduct for agency costs ignores the reality that HP's synergies case likely already priced any 
agency cost reductions it may have expected. In short, the Court of Chancery acknowledged that 
there were estimates of the synergies expected by HP, and the record provides no reason to 
believe that those estimates omitted any other added value HP thought it could achieve because 
of the combination. For this reason, Aruba itself presented a deal price minus synergies 
value [*13]  of $19.10 per share as one of its suggested outcomes. 
As to this issue, Aruba never argued that its deal price minus synergies case did not fully account 
for all the "agency cost" reductions it expected, and the Court of Chancery's view that some 
measure of agency costs had to be accounted for finds no basis in the record. Nor does it find any 
basis in the corporate finance literature; given that all the cost reductions HP expected as a 
widely held, strategic buyer were likely to be fully accounted for by its expected synergies.38  
Theory here tracks the facts, and there was no reasonable basis to infer that Aruba was cheating 
itself out of extra agency cost reductions by using only the cost reductions that were anticipated 
in commercial reality. However, instead of at least awarding Verition the deal price minus HP's 
estimate of its expected synergies left with the seller, which generated a value that was 
corroborated by the standalone DCF models used by Aruba's and HP's boards in agreeing to the 
transaction,39  the Court of Chancery gave exclusive weight to the thirty-day average 
unaffected [*14]  market price of $17.13 per share. 
In addition to believing that it had to account for unspecified agency costs, the Court of 
Chancery also seemed to suggest that rote reliance on market prices was compelled based on its 
reading of DFC and Dell.40  Like any human perspective, the trial judge's broader reading of 
Dell and DFC is arguable, but the trial judge's sense that those decisions somehow compelled 
him to make the decision he did was not supported by any reasonable reading of those decisions 
or grounded in any direct citation to them. Among other things, the trial judge seemed to find it 
novel that DFC and Dell recognized that when a public company with a deep trading market is 
sold at a substantial premium to the preannouncement price, after a process in which interested 
buyers all had a fair and viable opportunity to bid, the deal price is a strong indicator of fair 
value, as a matter of economic reality and theory. The apparent novelty the trial judge perceived 
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is surprising, given the long history of giving important weight to market-tested deal prices in the 
Court of Chancery [*15]  and this Court, a history that long predated the trial judge's contrary 
determination in Dell.41  
For example, the Court of Chancery equated the view that the deal price can serve as reliable 
evidence of fair value when a buyer pays the highest price, after other logical buyers have been 
given access to confidential information and a fair chance to present a superior offer, with being 
one that "discount[s] the importance of competition."42  Of course, HN3  when there is an 
open opportunity for many buyers to buy and only a few bid (or even just one bids), that does not 
necessarily mean that there is a failure of competition; it may just mean that the target's value is 
not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war above the winning price.43  In this 
case, for instance, Aruba approached other logical strategic buyers prior to signing the deal with 
HP, and none of those potential buyers were interested. Then, after signing and the 
announcement of the deal, still no other buyer emerged even though the merger agreement 
allowed for superior bids. It cannot be that an [*16]  open chance for buyers to bid signals a 
market failure simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for 
them to engage in a bidding contest against each other. If that were the jurisprudential 
conclusion, then the judiciary would itself infuse assets with extra value by virtue of the fact that 
no actual market participants saw enough value to pay a higher price. That sort of alchemy has 
no rational basis in economics. 
In fact, encouraged by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,44  our courts have for years applied corporate 
finance principles such as the capital asset pricing model to value companies in appraisal 
proceedings in ways that depend on market efficiency. The reliable application of valuation 
methods used in appraisal proceedings, such as DCF and comparable companies analysis, often 
depends on market data and the efficiency of the markets from which that data is derived. For 
example, it is difficult to come up with a reliable beta if the subject company's shares do not 
trade in an efficient market,45  and the reliability of a comparable companies or transactions 
analysis depends on the underlying efficiency of the markets from which the multiples 
used [*17]  in the analysis are derived.46  
Even before this Court's seminal opinion in Weinberger, the old Delaware "block" method used 
market prices in one of its three prongs.47  In forsaking the Delaware block method as a rigid 
basis to determine fair value, Weinberger did not hold that market value was no longer relevant; 
in fact, Weinberger explicitly condoned its use.48  Extending this basic point, DFC and Dell 
merely recognized that HN4  a buyer in possession of material nonpublic information about the 
seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller when 
agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal price, and that view of value should be given 
considerable weight by the Court of Chancery absent deficiencies in the deal process.49  
Likewise, assuming an efficient market, the unaffected market price and that price as adjusted 
upward by a competitive bidding process leading to a sale of the entire company was likely to be 
strong evidence of fair value. By asserting that Dell and DFC "indicate[] that Aruba's unaffected 
market price is entitled [*18]  to substantial weight,"50  the Vice Chancellor seemed to suggest 
that this Court signaled in both cases that trading prices should be treated as exclusive indicators 
of fair value. However, Dell and DFC did not imply that the market price of a stock was 
necessarily the best estimate of the stock's so-called fundamental value at any particular time.51
 Rather, they did recognize that when a market was informationally efficient in the sense that 
"the market's digestion and assessment of all publicly available information concerning [the 
Company] [is] quickly impounded into the Company's stock price," the market price is likely to 
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be more informative of fundamental value.52  In fact, Dell's references to market efficiency 
focused on informational efficiency—the idea that markets quickly reflect publicly available 
information and can be a proxy for fair value—not the idea that an informationally efficient 
market price invariably reflects the company's fair value in an appraisal or fundamental value in 
economic terms.53  Nonetheless, to the extent the Court of Chancery read DFC and Dell as 
reaffirming the traditional Delaware view,54  which is accepted in corporate finance, that the 
price a stock trades [*19]  at in an efficient market is an important indicator of its economic 
value that should be given weight, it was correct.55  And to the extent that the Court of 
Chancery also read DFC and Dell as reaffirming the view that when that market price is further 
informed by the efforts of arm's length buyers of the entire company to learn more through due 
diligence, involving confidential non-public information, and with the keener incentives of 
someone considering taking the non-diversifiable risk of buying the entire entity, the price that 
results from that process is even more likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental value, it 
was correct.56  
Here, the price that HP paid could be seen as reflecting a better assessment of Aruba's going-
concern value for reasons consistent with corporate finance theory. For starters, the unaffected 
market price was a measurement from three to four months prior to the valuation date, a time 
period during which it is possible [*20]  for new, material information relevant to a company's 
future earnings to emerge. Even more important, HP had more incentive to study Aruba closely 
than ordinary traders in small blocks of Aruba shares, and also had material, nonpublic 
information that, by definition, could not have been baked into the public trading price. For 
example, HP knew about Aruba's strong quarterly earnings before the market did, and likely took 
that information into account when pricing the deal. Based on the record evidence, the Court of 
Chancery could easily have found that HP and Aruba's back and forth over price, HP's access to 
nonpublic information to supplement its consideration of the public information available to 
stock market buyers, and the currency of the information that they had at the time of striking a 
bargain had improved the parties' ability to estimate Aruba's going-concern value over that of the 
market as a whole.57  In particular, HP had better insight into Aruba's future prospects than the 
market because it was aware that Aruba expected its quarterly results to exceed analysts' 
expectations.58  When those strong quarterly results were finally reported—after the close of 
the period that the [*21]  Court of Chancery used to measure the "unaffected market price"—
Aruba's stock price jumped 9.7%. Indeed, after the market learned about the strong quarter and 
the likelihood of a strategic deal with HP, Aruba's stock traded at $24.81, $0.14 away from the 
actual price HP paid. Of course, despite expressing concern about the fact that no other bidder 
emerged to compete with HP at the $24-plus price range, the Court of Chancery then awarded 
Verition $7.54 per share less than the $24.67 deal price. 
By relying exclusively on the thirty-day average market price, the Court of Chancery not only 
abused its discretion by double counting agency costs but also injected due process and fairness 
problems into the proceedings. As Verition argued, the Vice Chancellor's desire not to award 
deal price minus synergies could be seen—in light of his letter to the parties and the overall tone 
of his opinion and reargument decision—as a results-oriented move to generate an odd result 
compelled by his personal frustration at being reversed in Dell. Indeed, the idea of awarding the 
stock price came into the proceedings from the Vice Chancellor himself after requesting 
supplemental [*22]  post-trial briefing on the matter.59  Prior to that point, neither party argued 
for that figure as the fair value under § 262. Because the Vice Chancellor introduced this issue 
late in the proceedings, the extent to which the market price approximated fair value was never 
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subjected to the crucible of pretrial discovery, expert depositions, cross-expert rebuttal, expert 
testimony at trial, and cross examination at trial. Instead, the Vice Chancellor surfaced Aruba's 
stock price as an appropriate measure of fair value in a way that is antithetical to the traditional 
hallmarks of a Court of Chancery appraisal proceeding. The lack of a developed record on 
whether the stock price was an adequate proxy for fair value buttresses our holding that the Court 
of Chancery abused its discretion by awarding the thirty-day average unaffected market price of 
$17.13 per share. 
These procedural issues relate to substance in an important way. The reason for pretrial 
discovery and trial is for parties to have a chance to test each other's evidence and to give the 
fact-finder a reliable basis to make an ultimate determination after each side has a fair chance to 
develop a record and to comment upon [*23]  it. The lack of that process here as to the Vice 
Chancellor's ultimate remedy is troubling. The Vice Chancellor slighted several important 
factors in choosing to give exclusive weight to the unaffected market price. Under the semi-
strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price is not 
assumed to factor in nonpublic information. In this case, however, HP had signed a 
confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic 
information, and had a much sharper incentive to engage in price discovery than an ordinary 
trader because it was seeking to acquire all shares. Moreover, its information base was more 
current as of the time of the deal than the trading price used by the Vice Chancellor. 
Compounding these issues was the reality that Aruba was set to release strong earnings that HP 
knew about in the final negotiations, but that the market did not. As previously noted, Aruba's 
stock price jumped 9.7% once those earnings were finally reported to the public. None of these 
issues were illuminated in the traditional way, and none of them were discussed by the Court of 
Chancery in a reasoned way in giving exclusive [*24]  weight to a prior trading price that was 
$7.54 below what HP agreed to pay, and well below what Aruba had previously argued was fair 
value. 
This multitude of concerns gives us pause, as does the evident plausibility of Verition's concern 
that the trial judge was bent on using the thirty-day average market price as a personal reaction to 
being reversed in a different case. In a reargument decision addressing the petitioner's argument 
to this effect, the Vice Chancellor denied that this was the case.60  We take him at his word. 
However, so too do we take him at his word that he viewed an estimate of deal price minus 
synergies as compelling evidence of fair value on this record but that he could not come up with 
a reliable estimate of his own because he wanted to double count agency costs, and also lacked 
confidence in his underlying synergy deduction.61  Nevertheless, fixing the double counting 
problem and hewing to the record developed by the parties themselves leaves a reliable estimate 
of deal price minus synergies,62  which is the one that Aruba advanced until the Vice 
Chancellor himself injected the thirty-day average market price as his own speculative idea. Of 
course, estimating synergies [*25]  and allocating a reasonable portion to the seller certainly 
involves imprecision, but no more than other valuation methods, like a DCF analysis that 
involves estimating (i) future free cash flows; (ii) the weighted average cost of capital (including 
the stock's beta); and (iii) the perpetuity growth rate. But here there is no basis to think Aruba 
was being generous in its evaluation of deal price minus synergies. And, as any measure of value 
should be, Aruba's $19.10 deal price minus synergies value is corroborated by abundant record 
evidence.63  
The Vice Chancellor himself concluded that because the HP—Aruba transaction involved 
enormous synergies, "the deal price . . . operates as a ceiling for fair value."64  That conclusion 
11 
 
was abundantly supported by the record. Aruba's estimate of $19.10 resulting from that method 
was corroborated by HP's and Aruba's real-time considerations65  and Aruba's DCF,66  
comparable companies,67  and comparable transactions analyses.68  
Rather than burden the parties with further proceedings, we order that [*26]  a final judgment be 
entered for the petitioners in the amount of $19.10 per share plus any interest to which the 
petitioners are entitled. 
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